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South Africa is widely acknowledged as having a social grant system that is unusual in the developing world in 
terms of its scope and effectiveness in reducing and alleviating poverty. The grants are recognised for achieving 
major impact without imposing conditions on grant recipients. Despite this acknowledged success, there 
are repeated suggestions that South Africa should consider imposing conditions. The suggestions arise, in 
particular, in respect of the child support grant. 
This Children Count brief looks at the arguments and counter-arguments for having conditions attached to the child 
support grant (CSG): 
•	 On this page we explain what is meant by conditions, and present the main arguments offered for introducing 
conditions.
•	 The inside pages provide an overview of the CSG – its growth, reach and impact in the absence of conditions – 
and then discuss whether conditions are appropriate in South Africa, using evidence from national surveys. 
•	 On the back page, we summarise attempts to impose conditions. 
What is a condition?
A condition exists when a person must behave in a specified way – for instance ensuring that their child is 
immunised or attends school regularly – in order to receive or continue receiving a social grant. Conditional cash 
transfers, often referred to as CCTs, are particularly common in Latin America, although agencies such as the 
World Bank are now encouraging their introduction elsewhere. In South Africa, social grants have generally been 
unconditional in that recipients have not been required to comply with behavioural rules in order to continue 
receiving their grants.
What are the arguments for attaching conditions to social grants?
Those who advocate for conditional grants offer four main reasons:
• Bigger effects: by forcing recipients to take action to improve the education and health of themselves or their 
children, the cash transfer can accomplish longer-term and more wide-reaching benefits than immediate poverty 
alleviation.
• Socio-cultural biases: in a male-dominated society where girls suffer discrimination, conditions may be used as 
an incentive to encourage parents and other caregivers to send their girl children to school.
• Stigma: those who receive grants may feel ashamed or stigmatised if they receive ‘something for nothing’. 
• Political acceptability: those who are not eligible for grants will be more willing to accept the distribution of 
public funds (including their taxes) to the poor if this is not seen merely as a hand-out.    
Are the arguments applicable in South Africa?
• South African grants have achieved substantial impact without conditions. The positive effects include the areas 
of child health and education, which are seen as critical to longer-term poverty reduction. 
• Concerns about gender parity in school access are not relevant in South Africa, as school attendance rates are 
the same for boys and girls. 
• Concerns about stigma are also not relevant, as the prevalence of poverty means that a large number of 
households qualify and grant recipients are therefore not an exceptional group. 

















What is the CSG?
The child support grant is a government grant 
paid each month to primary caregivers of 
children in South Africa.  To be eligible, the 
applicant caregiver must pass an income 
means test. The value of the grant is R270 per 
child per month in 2011. 
What is the difference between 
‘eligibility requirements’ and 
‘conditions’?
All cash transfers that are not universal use 
some kind of eligibility criteria, such as age 
requirements or an income threshold (means 
test) for applicants. There are also usually 
other requirements, such as possession of 
an identity document. All of these define the 
characteristics or qualifications necessary to 
access the grant. But they are not conditions.
Conditions (also called ‘conditionalities’) 
are imposed in addition to the eligibility 
requirements, and require that the beneficiary 
must behave in a specified way. The condition 
may require once-off performance, such as 
getting the child fully immunised. Or it may 
require ongoing behaviour, such as ensuring 
that the child attends school. 
What is the difference between ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ conditions?
When conditions are enforced, they are called 
hard conditions and beneficiaries who do not 
behave in the specified way risk losing the 
benefit. When non-compliance does not result 
in loss of the grant – and perhaps also results 
in measures to assist the beneficiary to comply 
– we talk about ‘soft’ conditions.   
What is the reach of the CSG?
The CSG was introduced in 1998 and expanded rapidly. In 2011, it is received by 
over 10 million children each month and is South Africa’s largest grant in terms 
of number of beneficiaries (children covered). However, it provides the smallest 
benefit (R270 in 2011) – only about a quarter of the amount of the old age pension 
and disability grant.
Fig. 1 Growth of the CSG 1998 – 2011
What is the impact of the unconditional CSG in 
South Africa?
Advocates for conditional cash transfers (CCTs) point to the beneficial impact 
conditional grants have on the children and families that receive them. They note 
that CCTs in other countries have resulted in decreased levels of poverty, increased 
levels of children’s school enrolment and attendance, and improved health of 
children. However, there is little evidence that the conditions, rather than the 
grants, bring these benefits. 
In South Africa, research has shown that the ‘un-conditional’ CSG has achieved 
similar impacts:
•	 The CSG decreases the child poverty headcount and contributes substantially 
to the income of the poorest households (Hall & Wright 2010; Woolard & 
Leibbrandt 2010).
•	 The CSG increases school enrolment levels among child beneficiaries (Case et 
al 2005; Budlender et al 2008; Williams 2007). There is also some evidence 
that it increases enrolment of the siblings of child beneficiaries (Budlender & 
Woolard 2006).
•	 The CSG improves children’s health and nutritional outcomes as measured by 
the well-known measure of height for age (Coetzee 2010; Agüero et al 2005).
•	 The CSG reduces the incidence of child hunger (Williams 2007).
•	 The CSG may reduce the likelihood of older children engaging in child labour 
(Budlender & Woolard 2006).
The fact that the CSG has achieved these impacts calls into question the 











































  Source: South African Social Security Agency: Monthly SOCPEN reports
No money / unaffordable 24%
Education is useless 17%
Illness / disability 15%
Unable to perform at school / failed 11%
Working / family commitment 11%
Pregnancy 6%
Completed education / sufficient 4%
Not accepted – too young / old 3%
Can’t get to school / too far 1%
Source: Own calculations from General Household Survey 2009
Assumption 3: All children are able to attend 
school
(Beneficiaries are able to comply with the condition)
Conclusion: Incorrect
Evidence: Although schooling is compulsory in South Africa, 
supply-side problems make it difficult for some children to attend. 
Every year some children are turned away from schools that are 
full. Over 2 million children do not have schools within a 30-minute 
radius of their home, and the vast majority walk to school. The 
high attendance rates reflect great effort and determination to 
reach schools. 
Fig 4. Proportion of school-age children who live far from 
school, by income quintile
Compulsory schooling age
Assumption 1: School-age children are not 
attending school
(There is a problem that needs to be addressed)
Conclusion: Incorrect
Evidence: School enrolment and attendance rates in South Africa 
are already high, for both boys and girls. 97% of children aged 7-17 
years attend an educational institution. Similarly high enrolment 
rates are recorded by the Department of Basic Education.
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Source: Own calculations from General Household Survey 2009
Are conditions appropriate in SA? An evidence-based enquiry.
In this section we examine the following condition, which has repeatedly been proposed:
“Children who receive child support grants must attend school.”
This may seem reasonable, but existing evidence shows the flaws in the assumptions behind this condition.
Assumption 2: Non-attendance at school is the 
result of bad choices by caregivers
(The ‘problem’ is the result of undesirable behaviour by the poor)
Conclusion: Incorrect
Evidence: The main reasons for non-attendance relate to 
the quality of education and the circumstances of the family. 
Conditions would risk excluding the most vulnerable children from 
both education and social grants.
Fig. 3 Main reason for non-attendance
(Based on school-age children who are not attending school)
Age
Absenteeism rates are fairly low amongst enrolled learners: a 
national survey found that 86% of learners did not miss more than 
5 school days in the year. The main reason for temporary absence 
was illness (84%), followed by physical access problems caused by 
weather conditions (9%) (Strassburg et al 2010). 
Assumption 4: School attendance = education = 
long-term poverty reduction
(Compliance with the behavioural requirements will lead to the 
desired outcomes)
Conclusion: Not necessarily
Evidence: While school attendance rates in South Africa are high, 
educational outcomes are poor. Government acknowledges that 
this is the result of institutional failings: absent teachers, badly 
managed schools, problems with the syllabus, text book delays and 
so on. Just going to school does not mean that children are getting 
educated and will subsequently find a job. 
Assumption 5: Conditions are legal
(The condition is not in conflict with a legal entitlement)
Conclusion: Not true without changing the law 
Evidence: Children have a constitutional and statutory right 
to social security. The Social Assistance Act does not give the 
Executive (government) the authority to limit children’s rights. 
A history of attempts to condition the CSG
Government has made several attempts to introduce conditions over the years.
1998  Introduction of the CSG. Initially, the CSG had a range of conditions, including 
that applicants provide proof that their children had been immunised. 
This requirement was dropped when it became clear that the requirement 
discriminated against children who were already disadvantaged and struggled 
to access health care services.
2004  Draft regulations to the Social Assistance Act. The draft regulations 
stated that the child must receive immunisation and, if of school-going age, 
must attend school regularly. It also included less measurable conditions or 
‘normative injunctions’ which described things that caregivers are normally 
expected to do such as provide food, clothing and shelter. All these conditions 
were dropped from the regulations in recognition that they were both 
unnecessary and impossible to implement.
2009  Draft amended regulations to the Social Assistance Act. Later draft 
regulations introduced a behavioural condition requiring proof every six months 
of the child’s enrolment and attendance at school. If the child failed to attend 
regularly, the CSG would be suspended. Following urgent submissions from 
children’s sector and human rights groups about the implications of these 
conditions, which would be punitive if enforced, the conditions were softened. 
The current regulations to the Social Assistance Act 2009 state that:
(5) The primary care giver must:
a)	 in respect of a child between the ages of seven and 18 years, cause such a child to be enrolled at and to 
attend school;
b) within one month of approval of a child support grant … provide proof of school or an educational 
institution enrolment and attendance to the Agency;
c) every six months … submit to the Director-General … that child’s recent school or educational institution 
report signed by the principal or head of that school or institution; and
d) where a child referred to in paragraph (a) is not enrolled or fails to attend school, notify the Director-
General of the National Department of Social Development, in writing.
These are ‘soft’ conditions because the grant may not be suspended if a child fails to 
attend school. But the conditions still cause problems:
•	 They impose time and financial costs on caregivers, who are required to provide 
regular ‘proof’ of the child’s school attendance.
•	 They impose on the Department of Basic Education the impossible task of 
reporting any CSG beneficiaries who are not in school.
•	 They place a duty on social workers to investigate and resolve all instances of non-
attendance. Yet social workers are already in short supply and unable to cope with 
cases of abuse, neglect and other critical child protection issues.
•	 Even if the conditions are intended to be ‘soft’, there is a risk that they will be 
enforced punitively by social security officials.
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